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The idea of bringing together the arts and
sciences is not new. In almost every age,
these two disciplines have had a difficult
and fragile relationship. Where does this
mutual fascination come from? What are
the limits of this dialog? How can we
avoid misunderstanding, and manage this
encounter in a productive way?
As an artist, I am often asked “Why do
you need this?” Actually my answer is that
I do not know. I do not need it to paint, nor
to ameliorate my art, and even not to reach
new directions of exploring. Five years ago,
I participated in a seminar regrouping 10
leading brain researchers with 10 leading
artists. For three days, artists and scientists
spoke about their work. It seemed to me
like two parallel monologs that can never
meet; scientists spoke about science and
artists spoke about their art.
As a painter, I was fascinated to discover
during the seminar that what we artists
always knew, in an intuitive way, had a
theoretical basis. I could better explain,
for instance, why there is a huge differ-
ence between painting from nature and
painting from photography.
But, naturally, this symposium did not
influence my way of painting; for me, as
for many other artists, the moment we cre-
ate must be completely intuitive. It slightly
resembles the moment the goalkeeper of a
football team reacts in front of a penalty
shot: a mixture of extreme concentration
and of emptiness of the mind. But in order
to arrive to this second where everything is
possible, he has to suffer many trainings.
In a way, the seminar was for me part of
this training.
The language of art is a highly sophis-
ticated one, and it is obvious why it is
a privileged subject for sciences of the
brain. Nevertheless, sciences, or any other
rigorous communicative language, cannot
explain art. The first sentence of Zeki
(1999) in his book Inner Vision is, “This is
not so much a book about art, it is more
a book about brain.” This impossibility is
not due to a provisory lack of information,
but because of the very different structure
of the language of art and science.
What do we expect in the contempla-
tion of a piece of art? For us, moderns, it
certainly does not have a magical function
(like Egyptian Art, for instance, a func-
tion which has a real influence on the real
world). When art lovers are asked to bet-
ter define why they need art, they speak
of pleasure. But what kind of pleasure?
Is it the same kind of pleasure that one
derives from a good meal? Should painting
be studied by scientists as gastronomy is?
This comparison hurts the artists
(Although, alas, art critics and restau-
rant critics share the same page of the
newspapers!). When people are asked to
be more precise about the word “plea-
sure,” they speak of “emotion,” they evoke
the feeling of “diving” into the piece, to
“forget themselves,” to identify them-
selves with the subject, they speak of a
“dream awakened,”—all are feelings that
you could not have while sitting in front
of a plate of seafood. A piece of art makes
us dream.
Of course, a piece of art also delivers
an esthetic pleasure in the “gastronomic”
sense of the word, but this is secondary.
In what way does a piece of art make us
dream?Why can we not stop looking at the
Madonna by Raphael, while the (almost)
same painting by a different artist leaves
us indifferent? Why does the Montagne
Sainte-Victoire painted by Cézanne makes
us dream, while a photograph of it just
looks like a mountain? Art is not a repre-
sentation of nature in a beautiful way; It
is a different kind of signification. There is
a deep difference between the language of
art and the language of everyday.
The language-of-everyday is based upon
the assumption that you can understand
what is said. The more accurate it is,
the more communicative it becomes (For
instance, in writing these lines, I make
great effort to be as clear as possible).
Sometimes, perfectly understanding this
language is a question of life and death;
if you do not understand the significa-
tion of a red light, for example, you might
have a car accident. The language of law
and the language of the sciences should
be as precise as possible. The most min-
imalist expression of this language is the
pictogram. When you see a sign repre-
senting very schematically a man and a
woman—often just a circle representing
the head, a triangle for a skirt and two rect-
angles for the trousers—you understand
that this signifies the restrooms.
But just suppose this sign is found by
future archeologists who have no under-
standing of its meaning; they will under-
stand it through associations, they might
hang this piece in a museum of art next to
Adam and Eve by Durer, a Fang wooden
sculpture of a couple, an Egyptian paint-
ing of Nout (the deity of sky) and Geb
(the deity of earth), Joseph and Miriam
by Rembrandt, and many other pieces
of “art.”
There is, I think, a great difference
between the language of art and the
pictogram (or the-language-of-everyday).
The language of the pictogram functions
through the understanding of the nega-
tion, the language of art functions through
associations and ignores negation.
One pictogram is enough to describe
the universe. Take, for example, the pic-
togram of a tree. You can split the universe
into “tree” and “not a tree.” It would be a
very poor language but it would be, thanks
to the negation, enough to describe the
universe. But the painting of a tree means
something else.
Many years ago, I painted my 3-
year-old son and my 5-year-old daughter
beneath a huge palm tree. When my son
explained the painting, he said, “This is
my sister. This is me. And this tree is my
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father.” In a sense, he understood that the
question is not “Is this a tree or not a
tree?” but about the different associations
the tree can evoke.
I would like to be more precise about
this notion of association and give a few
examples:
1. Association to another piece of art:
those three trees etched by Rembrandt
remind us of the three crosses of the
crucifixion, they remind us also of the
hair of this self-portrait. Something of
the “sense” of the crucifixion affects the
“sense” of the landscape. Something of
the curled hair colors the “significa-
tion” of the trees.
2. Associations within a painting: when
Cézanne says that the shoulders of the
women must be connected with the
curb of the mountains, something of
the “sense” of the mountain affects the
“sense” of the women and vice versa.
Those influences of sense occur all the
time in a piece of art, and are absent in
a “banal” photograph which has been
“decorated” with artistic effects.
3. The association can work in the direc-
tion of the world to the painting, like in
the case of my 3-year-old son, but it can
also work in the other direction: from
the painting to the world. I always say
that for me the most important place
in a museum is the windows: a visit to
the Louvre, and through a window I
can see trees, cars, buses . . . I walk a few
steps and stand in front of a Poussin . . .
a few more steps, and I reach another
window, but the trees “have changed,”
they look like the trees in the paint-
ing. To me, probably the most impor-
tant “function” of art is “to change our
vision of nature.” An exhibition has a
signification when I go outside and the
street has changed.
Art accompanies us for a long time
after we have exited the museum. A
few months ago, while immobilized for
a treatment of acupuncture, I did the
following experiment: i tried to listen
to the noises surrounding me as if they
were a piece of music: the cars, the
steps, the voices, the birds, the wind in
the trees . . . (The day before, I listened
to a contemporary music concert that
used the same noises). I was listening as
if it “had a sense,” as if it was a piece of
music written by some composer. After
only a few minutes, I was so exhausted
that I could not go on. Being a painter,
this is what I am doing almost all of
the time with my sense of vision, and
in a natural way, without difficulty. My
many years of practice allowme to “see”
the world as if it were a painting.
4. The list of the associations art can pro-
vide is as long as all fields of human
activities: music, poetry, philosophy,
politics . . ..
Language of art functions in a completely
different way than the-language-of-
everyday. Moreover, the language of
everyday is much too “poor” to describe
the language of art. Kantor demonstrates
why a group (a,b,c, . . .) is always “smaller”
than a group of the associations of those
elements (a, ab, abc, ac, . . .). It might be
possible to use this demonstration to show
FIGURE 1 | Rembrandt VanRijn, (up left) Three trees, etching with dry point and engraving. (up right) The three cross, etching with dry point and
engraving, (down left) Self portrait, etching with dry point and engraving.
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why our ordinary language is too poor to
describe a piece of art (which functions
through associations). To me, it seems
intuitively true.
Poets and lawyers speak two completely
different languages with different rules
even though they use the same raw mate-
rials of vocabulary. This is why it is a
non-sense to try to translate a piece of
poetry into its own language, and why it is
necessary to translate it infinitely into oth-
ers, while a legal document needs only be
translated once. Furthermore, attempts to
explain art using the language of everyday
freezes the streams of infinite associations.
The notion of “sense” is completely dif-
ferent when it refers to a piece of art. The
question “what does it mean?”—which
includes in ordinary language the possibil-
ity of saying “what it does not mean”—has
no meaning when it deals with art. One of
my paintings was described by two promi-
nent and sensitive critics as “a hymn to
life” and as “a march toward death.” I did
not feel any contradiction between those
two statements. Hamlet could be a young
blond virgin actor, or a fat, unshaven,
bisexual 45-year-old-man. This text makes
us dream. This is why there is a need to
come back to it again and again. . . Art is a
paradox, in the sense that you are not able
to say if it is right or wrong.
When I am asked that question, “What
does it mean?” I always answer “every-
thing.” A real, a deep, a great piece of art
contains, through an infinite number of
associations, the whole world.
One of the most common misunder-
standings about art is to think that it is
composed of “sense” (a pictogram) dec-
orated with “beauty.” In this way of see-
ing, the painting of Cézanne would be the
painting of a mountain, but represented
in a “beautiful” way, like a beautifully
“designed” mountain. There are comput-
ers programs that allow us to transform
a banal photograph into something that
looks like a painting. Too often, the painter
is considered almost as if he or she is a
very sophisticated program of this kind,
and this is wrong. To me, a piece of art is
not “sense” + “beauty,” or just “beauty.” It
is another kind of sense.
Art makes us dream, a pictogram does
not. A painting of a tree is not a pictogram
of a tree with the addition of “beauty.”
Art, as well as dreams, functions by asso-
ciations and ignores negation. Like in a
dream, the objects or the forms, because
of the very special structure of the work of
art, undergo transformations, metamor-
phoses that do not hurt our logic.
This is also the reason why there is
progress in science and not in art. The
physics of Newton becomes a particular
detail in the theory of Einstein. On the
contrary, Cezanne, by creating new asso-
ciations with the work of Poussin, makes
it richer (Moreover, the work of Poussin
enriches the work of Cezanne. Time func-
tions in both directions). A new piece of
art does not render an earlier piece of
art irrelevant or old-fashioned; rather, it
enriches it as it does with all other exist-
ing pieces. While listening to a quartet of
Bartok, you can hear how it dialogs with
Beethoven, with Bach, or with Hungarian
folk music. In a way, we could say that lin-
ear history has, in this context, no mean-
ing. Therefore, whereas the ideal of science
is to develop a language which should be
more and more concise, the language of
art is becoming wider and wider. The lan-
guage of sciences is convergent; the one of
art is divergent.
This makes any description of art very
limited. If youwere one day in the presence
of two painters speaking of art, you would
probably be surprised at how clumsy the
dialog can be. Using pantomime, or very
vague expressions like “it works” or “it
does not work,” using concepts from other
disciplines like “it is too sweet!” or “too
heavy,” or taken frommusic like “rhythm,”
“tonality,” “accord,” “major or minor” (It
works also the other way: i have assisted
at a violin master-class with ShlomoMintz
where he used concepts taken from paint-
ing, like “line,” “colorful,” “black and
white,” “blurry”. . . !).
It is understandable, why art, which
requires a highly sophisticated activity of
the brain, interests scientists. Not as an
effort to understand art better, but for
the needs of scientific research. It is less
understandable why artists need sciences.
It could be that artists are just inter-
ested in all fields of human behavior. They
“use” scientific theory as a source of inspi-
ration and then throw it away. At some
time they are interested by the theory of
the decomposition of light, and they create
Impressionism, at other times by the the-
ory of relativity, and they create Futurist
paintings, etc. This, without any linear
coherence to the theories they refer to. It
is just a toy they can play with, and then
leave.
It could also be that science and art
are both linked to some “deep philoso-
phy” of the time. It is fascinating to see,
for instance, that the publication of the
poem “Un coup de dés jamais n’abolira le
hasard” by Stéphane Mallarmé, was pub-
lished at the same time as Poincarré stud-
ies on the hazard, while there were no
known connections between the two men.
For some obscure reason, some idea circu-
lates at a certain time and challenges both
scientists and artists.
As I wrote above, the seminar on Art
and Brain was—and still is—a part of
my “training” as an artist. It allowed me
to understand better the way in which
vision functions, but the main lesson of
this encounter was the idea of mapping.
The idea of dividing the brain activity
into zones which have different functions
and work as a net of inter-references,
has some similarity with the activities of
the young generation of artists, mixing in
the same exhibition video art, heteroge-
neous drawings (figurative, abstracts, pic-
tograms), installations, performances, etc.
It seems to me that this way of activity,
also parallels the way we use the inter-
net, and in some strange and remote way,
the new conception of the world as a net
of multi-cultural, multi-national, multi-
religious identities. This idea of a dynamic
“map” is, today, in the spirit of the time,
and it seems that the Hegelian conception
of history of art is transformed into a more
dynamic conception of the “geography” of
art. Instead of historical exhibitions, there
are more andmore museums showing side
by side African sculptures, Egyptian art, oil
paintings of the seventeenth century, with
contemporary art. This might be the spirit
of the time both for science and for art.
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